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Paul Giannelli has written—with clarity and conviction—on just 
about every type of scientific evidence commonly used in criminal cases. 
To celebrate his extraordinary contributions, this Article surveys the 
development of the law on one type of feature-matching evidence that 
repeatedly attracted Paul’s attention. This summary reinforces and ex-
tends Paul’s work on what this Article will call “firearm-mark evi-
dence.”1 By inspecting toolmarks on bullets or spent cartridge cases, 
firearms examiners can supply valuable information on whether a 
particular gun fired the ammunition in question. But the limits on this 
information have not always been respected in court, and a growing 
number of opinions have tried to address this fact. Reviewing this devel-
opment is significant not merely because the evidence is commonly 
employed in criminal cases, but also because of a recent, highly pub-
licized 2  argument against its admission from some of the nation’s 
 
†  Distinguished Professor of Law and Weiss Family Scholar, Penn State Law. 
1. “Although this subject is popularly known as ‘ballistics,’ that term is not 
correct.” 1 Paul C. Giannelli et al., Scientific Evidence § 14.01, at 
755 (5th ed. 2012). 
2. E.g., Alex Kozinski, Rejecting Voodoo Science in the Courtroom, Wall St. 
J. (Sept. 19, 2016, 7:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rejecting-
voodoo-science-in-the-courtroom-1474328199 [https://perma.cc/4WAH-
NBNW]. 
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leading scientists and technologists3 and because it can inform a pend-
ing effort to improve the federal rules as they apply to forensic-science 
identification evidence.4 
As we shall see, the courts have moved from a position of skepticism 
of the ability of examiners to link bullets and other ammunition compo-
nents to a particular gun to full-blown acceptance of claims of identifi-
cation “to the exclusion of all other firearms.”5 Although challenges to 
firearm-mark evidence over the past decade or so have generated 
occasional restrictions on the degree of confidence that firearms experts 
can express in their source identifications, they have not altered the 
paradigm of supplying source conclusions instead of statements about 
the degree to which the evidence supports these conclusions.6 After re-
viewing the stages in the judicial reception of firearm-mark evidence, 
this Article concludes by describing a more scientific, quantitative, evi-
dence-based form of testimony that should supplant or augment the 
current experience-based decisions of skilled witnesses. 
I. Rejection of Expert Source Attributions 
For a time, courts did not admit testimony that items originated 
from a particular firearm. Some courts reasoned that jurors could make 
 
3. Exec. Office of the President, President’s Counsel of Advisors 
on Sci. & Tech., Report to the President: Forensic Science in 
Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-
Comparison Methods (2016) [hereinafter 2016 PCAST Report]. 
4. David H. Kaye, How Daubert and Its Progeny Have Failed Criminalistics 
Evidence and a Few Things the Judiciary Could Do About It, 86 Fordham 
L. Rev. 1639 (2018). 
5. E.g., In re Barrett, 840 F.3d 1223, 1238 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Ballistics expert 
Terrance Higgs tied the bullet fragment that killed Eales to Defendant’s .223 
Colt H Bar Sporter rifle, ‘to the exclusion of all guns that are made or that 
will be made.’”); United States v. Law, 252 F.3d 1357, 2001 WL 422948, at 
*1 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[B]allistics expert testified that the cartridge recovered 
at the earlier robbery and the cartridge used in the Griffin carjacking were 
used in the same weapon ‘to the exclusion of all other firearms in the 
world.’”). 
6. In this context, a source conclusion is a statement about the truth or 
probability of the hypothesis that a specific, known gun fired the bullet in 
question. Statements of support stop short of drawing a conclusion about 
the hypothesis. Instead, they describe the probability of the evidence—the 
extent to which the features of the items being compared are observed to 
correspond—under competing source hypotheses. See David H. Kaye et 
al., The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence—Expert Evidence 
ch. 14 (2d ed. 2011); David H. Kaye, Hypothesis Testing in Law and Forensic 
Science: A Memorandum, 130 Harv. L. Rev. F. 127 (2017); infra Part VI. 
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the comparisons and draw their own conclusions. In People v. Weber,7 
for example, the trial court struck from the record an examiner’s testi-
mony “that in his opinion the two bullets taken from the bodies were 
fired from this pistol, leaving that as a question for the jury to deter-
mine by an inspection of the bullets themselves.”8 In this 1904 trial, the 
court did not question the expert’s ability to discover toolmarks that 
could be probative of identity, but it saw no reason to believe that the 
expert would be better than lay jurors at drawing inferences from that 
information.9 Other courts allowed such opinions, but not if they were 
stated as “facts.”10 
II. Acceptance of Expert Source Attributions 
With the recognition that the line between “opinions” and “facts” 
had little substance and with the demise of the rigid rule prohibiting 
“ultimate facts”—which were said to “invade the province of the 
jury”11—courts came to admit conclusive source attributions. Firearms 
examiners reasoned that  
It may be quite common for two or more prominent individual 
marks on bullets from two entirely different guns to match 
exactly, but the chance that there will be a correspondence of a 
great many of the individual characteristic marks on two bullets 
that came from different guns is so remote as to amount to a 
practical impossibility.12  
By the 1950s, it was understood that:  
 
7. 86 P. 671 (Cal. 1906). 
8. Id. at 678. 
9. The court explained that “the comparison of the . . . bullets . . . is not a 
matter of expert testimony, but one within the ordinary capacities of the 
average juror or citizen.” Id. 
10. E. LeFevre, Annotation, Expert Evidence to Identify Gun from Which Bullet 
or Cartridge Was Fired, 26 A.L.R. 2d 892, § 3, at 898 (1952). For example, 
in State v. Martinez, the state supreme court held that testimony that stated 
“positively that the evidence bullet (death bullet) was fired out of 
[defendant’s] gun” was an instance of inadmissible “conclusions stated as 
facts and not as opinions.” 198 P.2d 256, 260–61 (N.M. 1948). 
11. E.g., Grismore v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 5 N.W.2d 646, 655 (Iowa 1942), 
overruling State v. Steffen, 230 N.W. 536, 538 (Iowa 1930). 
12. Julian S. Hatcher, Textbook of Firearms Investigation, 
Identification and Evidence 287–88 (1st ed. 1935); cf. Albert S. 
Osborn, Questioned Documents 227–30 (2d ed. 1929) (asserting that 
duplication of class and individual characteristics of handwriting can be 
“practically impossible” because the joint probability is a “negligible 
quantity”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Firearm-Mark Evidence: Looking Back and Looking Ahead 
726 
[T]he modern tendency of the courts [is] to allow the introduction 
of expert testimony to show that the bullet or cartridge found at 
the scene of a crime was fired from a particular gun, where it is 
definitely shown that the witness by whom the testimony is 
offered is, by experience and training, qualified to give an expert 
opinion on firearms and ammunition.13  
Firearms and other types of examiners were known to testify that their 
judgments are not subject to any margin of error14 and are scientific 
certainties.15 Of course, expert testimony was not required to be so ex-
treme; testimony that a bullet merely could or might have come from 
a particular firearm also was admissible.16 
III. Heightened Scrutiny Following Daubert 
Beginning in the 1990s, scientists and lawyers began to question 
the theories of individualization and discernible uniqueness of firearms 
toolmarks. They asked how examiners, operating without standards 
explicitly defining what degree of similarity in a set of features warrants 
a source attribution, could know—in the sense described in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals17—that a given gun fired the recovered 
items. A series of challenges to the admissibility of source attributions 
by firearms examiners ensued, and professional examiners responded 
with an “Admissibility Resource Kit” to “assist firearm examiners in 
better preparing for evidence admissibility hearings that began to 
greatly proliferate in 2002.”18 
 
13. LeFevre, supra note 10, § 5, at 901. 
14. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 422, 434 (Va. 1985). The Virginia 
Supreme Court saw no problem with “[t]his positive statement” which 
“merely affects the weight of his testimony” and “does not necessarily 
invalidate or even weaken the results of his ballistics testing.” Id. 
15. United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (noting 
that FBI supervisory special agent Paul Tangren “opined that he held this 
opinion to a 100% degree of certainty.”). 
16. Giannelli et al., supra note 1, § 14.06[a], at 773; Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, Admissibility of Testimony That Bullet Could or Might Have 
Come from Particular Gun, 31 A.L.R. 4th 486, 487 (1984). 
17. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert interpreted the phrase “scientific knowledge” 
in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to mean “derived by the scientific 
method . . . supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ 
based on what is known.” Id. at 590. An untold number of cases have 
attempted to apply these generalities. See, e.g., Giannelli et al., supra 
note 1; Kaye et al., supra note 6, § 7.3. 
18. SWGGUN Admissibility Resource Kit (ARK), Ass’n Firearm & Tool 
Mark Exam’rs [hereinafter Admissibility Resource Kit], https://afte. 
org/resources/swggun-ark [https://perma.cc/F78P-KRPF] (last visited Feb. 
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Initially, the courts were unfazed by the post-Daubert skepticism 
about what they comfortably knew as “a recognized method of ballistics 
testing”19 that “has been accepted in criminal cases for many years.”20 
But then a number of federal district courts expressed misgivings about 
holistic judgments of “sufficient agreement of individual character-
istics.” 21 No court excluded all evidence of similarities, but several 
struggled to find ways to allow examiners to assist the jury without 
testifying that cartridge components definitely came from the known 
firearm or that nothing else was scientifically or practically possible. 
The first such case during this period was United States v. Green.22 In 
a summary of cases in this period, Paul called the opinion, written by 
U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner, “riveting.” 23  It restricted the 
firearms examiner to testifying about the matching features—a re-
version to the Weber era.24 The expert admitted that in applying the 
Association of Firearms and Toolmark Examiners’ (“AFTM”) theory 
 
11, 2018); cf. Kirsten Jackson, The Daubert Era, in Scientific 
Examination of Questioned Documents 37, 41 (Jan Seaman Kelly & 
Brian S. Lindblom eds., 2d ed. 2006) (attributing success in rebuffing “over 
30 Daubert challenges” to handwriting identification to “the Daubert Group” 
formed by the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners). 
19. United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he matching 
of spent shell casings to the weapon that fired them has been a recognized 
method of ballistics testing in this circuit for decades.”). 
20. United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 n.1, 377 (D. Md. 2004) 
(reasoning that “the ‘human ability to recognize a similar pattern and 
distinguish between dissimilar patterns’ makes identification possible”). 
Some courts frankly declined to require compliance with all the Daubert 
factors. E.g., United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (stating that acceptance “in the community of forensics experts” can 
substitute for acceptance in “a scientific community”). For more strategies 
used to avoid the strictures of Daubert for criminalistics identification 
evidence, see Kaye, supra note 4. 
21. Admissibility Resource Kit, supra note 18; cf. AFTE Theory of Identification 
as It Relates to Toolmarks, Ass’n Firearm & Tool Mark Exam’rs, 
https://afte.org/about-us/what-is-afte/afte-theory-of-identification [https: 
//perma.cc/3EQF-7JQ9] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018) (“[S]ufficient 
agreement” for “subjective” “individualization/identification” occurs “when 
the agreement in individual characteristics exceeds the best agreement 
demonstrated between toolmarks known to have been produced by different 
tools and is consistent with agreement demonstrated by toolmarks known to 
have been produced by the same tool.”). 
22. 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005). 
23. Paul C. Giannelli, Ballistics Evidence Under Fire, Crim. Just., Winter 
2011. 
24. See supra Part I. 
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of sufficiency,25 “it’s just your opinion? You determine which marks 
you’re going to pay attention to and which ones you’re not, correct?”26 
The court found the examiner’s assurance “that this match could be 
made ‘to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world’” to be “ex-
traordinary, particularly given [the] data and methods.”27 In view of the 
method’s subjectivity, potential for bias, and lack of data on error rates, 
the district court perceived “no accurate way of evaluating the testi-
mony.”28 
No other modern, published opinion has confined the examiner to 
reporting on similarities and differences in the toolmarks.29 Instead, a 
few concerned courts focused on how firmly an examiner could charac-
terize source attributions. In United States v. Monteiro, 30  another 
federal district judge in the same district adopted the more lenient rule 
that “the expert may testify that the cartridge cases were fired from a 
particular firearm to a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty. However, 
the expert may not testify that there is a match to an exact statistical 
certainty.”31 
Seeking a less opaque formulation, District Judge Jed Rakoff in 
United States v. Glynn32 excluded testimony of “a reasonable degree of 
ballistic certainty”33 in favor of a weaker statement of “more likely than 
not.”34 This conclusion-lite testimony, along with other evidence in the 
case, still led to a conviction and life sentence.35 
 
25. See supra note 20. 
26. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 112 n.15 (citation omitted). 
27. Id. at 107 (citation omitted). 
28. Id. at 121 (footnote omitted). 
29. For discussion of unadorned “features only testimony” and single-stage “‘not 
excluded’ or ‘match’” testimony for scientific identification evidence, see 
Kaye et al., supra note 6, §§ 15.3–15.4. 
30. 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006). 
31. Id. at 375. 
32. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
33. Id. at 574. 
34. Id. at 575. Giannelli et al., supra note 1, § 14.06[b], at 776–777, suggests 
that Monteiro used the same standard. However, the only use of the phrase 
is in a citation to a case involving bite-mark evidence as one illustration of 
the type of testimony that would fall short of the “100 percent sure” 
formulation that the court excluded in favor of “reasonable degree of ballistic 
certainty.” Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 372. 
35. Press Release, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Bloods Gang Member 
Sentenced to Life in Prison for Ordering a Drug-Related Murder in 2000 
(Jan. 28, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/ 
January09/glynnsentencingpr.pdf [https://perma.cc/C78B-AW8J]. 
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The Glynn court denied that firearms source attributions 
“could . . . be called ‘science,’” 36  because when asked “what 
constitutes ‘sufficient agreement’ between two pieces of ballistic 
evidence to declare a match, [the government’s expert] admitted that 
the assessment is subjective, in that ‘it is an opinion of mine and wheth-
er or not someone else would agree with it is up to that individual.’”37  
The Glynn court may have been influenced by a report of a 
committee of the National Academy of Sciences.38 This NAS committee 
was formed to assess the feasibility of creating a computer-searchable 
national database “that would house images of firings of all newly 
manufactured and imported firearms . . . as an aid to criminal inves-
tigations.” 39  Although the committee was concerned with digital 
imaging and pattern-recognition technology, it began with an inquiry 
into the logic of traditional firearm-mark analysis.40 It reported that 
“[t]he validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and 
reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully 
demonstrated.”41 Moreover, the committee approved of opinions that 
“refused to accept ‘exclusion of all other firearms’ arguments”42 and dis-
approved of the practice of “overreach[ing] to make extreme probability 
statements.”43 
 
36. 578 F. Supp. 2d at 570. 
37. Id. at 571 (citation omitted). Thus, the court found that the AFTE 
“standard defining when an examiner should declare a match—namely, 
‘sufficient agreement’—is inherently vague.” Id. at 572. 
38. Id. 
39. Nat’l Research Council Comm. to Assess the Feasibility, 
Accuracy, and Tech. Capability of a Nat’l Ballistics Database, 
Ballistic Imaging 1–2 (Daniel L. Cork et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter 2008 
Report]. The committee concluded that such a database would not be 
advisable, but recommended enhancements to the existing National 
Integrated Ballistic Information Network. Id. at 4–6. 
40. Id. at 3 (“Underlying the specific tasks with which the committee was 
charged is the question of whether firearms-related toolmarks are unique: 
that is, whether a particular set of toolmarks can be shown to come from 
one weapon to the exclusion of all others. Very early in its work the 
committee found that this question cannot now be definitively answered.”). 
41. Id. at 3, 81. 
42. Id. at 82. 
43. Id. at 85. The AFTE disagreed. It maintained, as it always has, that 
examiners can and do achieve practical scientific certainty. AFTE Comm. 
for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm & Toolmark Identification, The 
Response of the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners to the 
National Academy of Sciences 2008 Report Assessing the Feasibility, 
Accuracy, and Technical Capability of a National Ballistics Database, AFTE 
J., Summer 2008, at 234, 242 [hereinafter AFTE Comm. Response]. 
However, the AFTE’s definition of “practical certainty” for “a scientific 
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IV. Heightened Scrutiny Following the 2009 NAS 
Report 
Soon after the 2008 NAS report, a larger NAS Committee on 
Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community observed 
that “[m]uch forensic evidence—including, for example, bite marks and 
firearm and toolmark identifications—is introduced in criminal trials 
without any meaningful scientific validation . . . .”44 The committee 
reiterated some of the statements from the 2008 report,45 emphasized 
the need for valid estimates of the uncertainties in forensic-science iden-
tification methods generally,46 and pointed to a way to express the pro-
bative value of the associations without drawing a source conclusion.47 
Neither the 2008 nor the 2009 NAS report made recommendations 
on admissibility of evidence, for that was not part of their charge.48 
Practitioners and prosecutors proposed that this meant that the reports 
 
conclusion” is surprisingly weak. It means only that “an 
examiner . . . believes the conclusion to be true and accurate; . . . has 
rational grounds for [the belief]; and acknowledges that, in the abstract, it is 
not possible to achieve absolute certainty for results flowing from a scientific 
theory or technique”; cf. John E. Murdock et al., The Development and 
Application of Random Match Probabilities to Firearm and Toolmark 
Identification, 62 J. Forensic Sci. 619, 624 (2017) (“Absolute certainty 
opinions may have been adopted in the past, but this type of position has 
been retired for some time and no longer represents the consensus thinking 
of the firearm and toolmark community. . . . [O]ur everyday lives are 
predicated upon practical certainty. There is a practical certainty that our 
car will start in the morning (assuming it is in good mechanical condition), 
or that our (normally obedient) dog will come when called.”). 
44. Nat’l Research Council, Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the 
Forensic Scis. Cmty., Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: A Path Forward 107–08 (2009) [hereinafter Nat’l 
Research Council Report] (citations omitted). 
45. Id. at 154. 
46. Id. at 184. 
47. The committee remarked that “[p]ublications such as Evett et al., Aitken 
and Taroni, and Evett provide the essential building blocks for the proper 
assessment and communication of forensic findings.” Id. at 186 (citations 
omitted). Such publications advocate strength-of-evidence statements rather 
than source conclusions. 
48. Indeed, the 2008 committee cautioned that “the proposal for this study 
explicitly precluded the committee from assessing the admissibility of forensic 
ﬁrearms evidence in court, either generally or in specific regard to testimony 
on ballistic imaging comparisons.” 2008 Report, supra note 39, at 20. In 
the next breath, the committee added the following: “We note, however, 
that high-subjectivity branches of forensic science are now confronting 
growing skepticism with regard to discernible uniqueness as a result of a 
number of legal and scientific studies.” Id. 
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should or could not be taken as undermining the admissibility of tradi-
tional highly judgmental pattern-matching identifications.49 However, 
the committees’ reviews of the literature clearly lent credence to the 
questions about the routine admission of categorical source attributions 
based on firearm-marks.50 In five prominent published opinions, courts 
 
49. E.g., AFTE Comm. Response, supra note 43, at 241–42; Government’s 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony Concerning 
Latent Fingerprint Evidence at 3, United States of America v. Faison, No. 
2008-CF2-16636 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2010), quoted in Harry T. 
Edwards, The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Sciences: 
What It Means for the Bench and Bar, 51 Jurimetrics J. 1, 5–6 (2010) 
(describing this argument as “utterly absurd”). 
50. For example, in describing the scientific basis of “forensic science fields like 
firearms examination,” the 2008 report quoted with approval an article by 
two forensic scientists stating that “[f]orensic individualization sciences that 
lack actual data, which is most of them, . . . simply . . . assume the 
conclusion of a miniscule probability of a coincidental match . . . .” 2008 
Report, supra note 39, at 54–55 (quoting John I. Thornton & Joseph L. 
Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic 
Identification, in 3 David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye,  Michael J. 
Saks, & Joseph Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and 
Science of Expert Testimony § 24-7.2, at 169 (2002)). Apparently 
recognizing the threat of such assessments, AFTE complained that the 
committees’ literature reviews were shallow. In response to the 2008 Report, 
it wrote that “the committee lacked the expertise and information necessary 
for the in-depth study that would be required to offer substantive statements 
with regard to these fundamental issues of firearm and toolmark 
identification.” AFTE Comm. Response, supra note 43, at 243. Likewise, it 
wrote that “the [2009] NAS committee in effect chose to ignore extensive 
research supporting the scientific underpinnings of the identification of 
firearm and toolmark evidence.” AFTE Comm. for the Advancement of the 
Sci. of Firearm & Toolmark Identification, The Response of the Association 
of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners to the February 2009 National 
Academy of Science Report “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States: A Path Forward,” AFTE J., Summer 2009, at 204, 206. According 
to AFTE, “years of empirical research . . . conclusively show[] that 
sufficient individuality is often present on tool (firearm tools or non-firearm 
tools) working surfaces to permit a trained examiner to conclude that a 
toolmark was made by a certain tool and that there is no credible possibility 
that it was made by any other tool working surface.” AFTE Comm. 
Response, supra note 43, at 242. After all, “[t]he principles and techniques 
utilized in forensic firearms identification have been used internationally for 
nearly a century by the relevant forensic science community to both identify 
and exclude specific firearms as the source of fired bullets and cartridge 
cases.” Id. at 237 (emphasis added). Prosecutors too sought to blunt the 
implications of the skeptical statements about the limited validation of the 
premises of the traditional theory of firearm-mark identification with an 
affidavit from the chairman of the NAS committee that wrote the 2008 
Report. Affidavit of John E. Rolph at 1–3, United States v. Edwards, No. 
F-516-01 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 23, 2008). Yet, the affidavit merely collects 
excerpts from the report itself and ends with one that could be read as 
supporting admissibility under certain conditions. For another affidavit from 
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cited the NAS reports and the opinions cited in in Part III of this Article 
to limit such testimony. First, the district court in United States v. 
Taylor 51 deemed the AFTE theory of sufficiency “circular.” 52 It re-
iterated the assessment of the 2009 NAS committee that “a funda-
mental problem with toolmark and firearms analysis is the lack of a 
precisely defined process. . . . AFTE has adopted a theory of 
identification, but it does not provide a specific protocol.”53 To cope 
with the absence of controlling standards for making source attribu-
tions, the court held that the expert “will not be permitted to testify 
that his methodology allows him to reach this conclusion as a matter 
of scientific certainty [or] . . . that there is a match to the exclusion, 
either practical or absolute, of all other guns.”54 Instead, “[h]e may only 
testify that, in his opinion, the bullet came from the suspect rifle to 
within a reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms examination 
field.”55 
Second, United States v. Willock 56  provides the most extensive 
judicial analysis of firearms testimony to date. It observes that “tool-
mark analysis guidance provided by the AFTE lacks specificity because 
it allows an examiner to identify a match based on ‘sufficient agree-
ment,’ which the AFTE defines using the undefined terms ‘exceeds the 
best agreement’ and ‘consistent with.’”57 Based on “reading . . . the 
many published studies, journal articles, and cases,” Magistrate Judge 
Paul Grimm characterized “the AFTE theory . . . that once ‘sufficient 
 
a committee member contending that NAS “has questioned the validity of 
these fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility,” see 
Declaration of Alicia Carriquiry, PhD. In Support of Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Firearms Examiner’s Opinion at 5, People v. Knight, No. LA067366 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 2012). The use of affidavits of one or two committee 
members to give their personal views on what the words that the committee 
as a whole agreed upon is ill-advised. It resembles asking individual members 
of Congress to provide their post hoc thoughts on what a committee report 
on legislation, or the statute itself, really meant. 
51. 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D.N.M. 2009). 
52. Id. at 1177. 
53. Id. at 1178 (quoting Nat’l Research Council Report, supra note 44, at 
155). 
54. Id. at 1180. 
55. Id. 
56. 696 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2010). 
57. Id. at 566 (quoting National Research Council Report, supra note 44, 
at 155). 
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agreement’ [establishes] a practical impossibility” as “astonishing[].”58 
The district court ordered “[t]hat [the expert] not be allowed to opine 
that it is a ‘practical impossibility’ for any other firearm to have fired 
the cartridges . . . [and that he] only be permitted to state his opinions 
and bases without any characterization as to degree of certainty.”59 
Third, in Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 60  the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court enumerated difficulties with the AFTE theory 
of sufficiency and practical impossibility. It settled on “reasonable de-
gree of ballistic certainty” as an acceptable indication of the limits of 
an opinion, and cautioned that “[p]hrases that could give the jury an 
impression of greater certainty, such as ‘practical impossibility’ and 
‘absolute certainty’ should be avoided.” 61  Likewise, it ruled that 
“‘reasonable degree of scientific certainty’ should . . .	be avoided 
because it suggests that forensic ballistics is a science, where it is clearly 
as much an art as a science.”62 
Fourth, the district court in United States v. Ashburn63—while 
declining to go as far as Green and Glynn in circumscribing source 
opinions—relied on the 2009 NAS Report and the criticisms of the 
AFTE sufficiency theory in the opinions discussed above to preclude 
“this expert witness from testifying that he is ‘certain’ or ‘100%’ 
sure . . . [or] that a match he identified is to ‘the exclusion of all other 
firearms in the world,’ or that there is a ‘practical impossibility’ that 
any other gun could have fired the recovered materials.”64 It limited the 
expert “to stating that his conclusions were reached to a ‘reasonable 
degree of ballistics certainty’ or a ‘reasonable degree of certainty in the 
ballistics field.’”65 
 
 
58. Id. at 572 (quoting Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundations 
of the Firearms and Tool Mark Identification Discipline: Responding to 
Recent Challenges, 52 J. Forensic Sci. 586, 590 (2007)). 
59. Id. at 581–82. 
60. 942 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 2011). 
61. Id. at 946. 
62. Id.; cf. United States v. Cazares, 788 F.3d 956, 989 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(distinguishing between “scientific certainty” and “a reasonable degree of 
certainty in the ballistics field,” holding that the latter expression “is the 
proper expert characterization of toolmark identification,” and failing to 
consider whether a report of “practical impossibility” would be admissible). 
63. 88 F. Supp. 3d 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
64. Id. at 249. 
65. Id. 
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Finally, in Gardner v. United States,66 the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals, without mentioning Willock, wrote that it was error 
to admit an examiner’s “unqualified opinion.”67 The court cited “ques-
tions about pattern matching generally, and bullet pattern matching 
specifically, [that] surfaced in the scientific community.”68 Although the 
opinion condemned “absolute or 100% certainty,” it did not specify the 
qualifications an examiner would have to place on source attributions, 
and it did not discuss the AFTE theory of sufficiency for “practical 
impossibility.”69 
To be clear, the cases collected here are exceptions to the normal, 
uncritical acceptance of firearm-mark testimony. And during this same 
period, other courts, in less detailed opinions, imposed no limitations 
on source attributions.70 In all, the modern opinions on firearms source 
attribution uniformly hold that the similarities in the features can be 
presented—just as the earliest opinions on the subject did—and all but 
one allow an expert to provide some opinion on the source hypothesis. 
But what kind of an opinion that should be is being probed with in-
creasing frequency. Although the still small number of critical cases are 
all over the map on how such opinions can or should be presented, this 
developing line of authority does seem to reflect a growing judicial sense 
of unease about the AFTE theory of personal sufficiency and practical 
impossibility, and no firm support for the theory is apparent in the legal 
commentary. To the contrary, legal commentators tend to criticize the 
modern opinions for not excluding all conclusions based on current 
 
66. 140 A.3d 1172 (D.C. 2016). 
67. Id. at 1184. 
68. Id. at 1183. 
69. Id. at 1184. 
70. E.g., United States v. Casey, 928 F. Supp. 2d 397, 399–400 (D.P.R. 2013) 
(stating that although “defendant challenges [the] conclusion that [the 
examiner] is 100% certain,” the court “remains faithful to the long-standing 
tradition of allowing the unfettered testimony of qualified ballistics experts”); 
United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261–62 (M.D. Ga. 2007) 
(permitting forensic ballistics expert to offer an opinion of a match “to a 
100% degree of certainty”); State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 205 (Tenn. 
2016) (“It’s like a fingerprint.”). 
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methods for comparisons 71  or for allowing “extremely misleading” 
phrases for a degree of certitude in a source attribution.72 
V. The 2016 PCAST Report 
A third report from scientists outside of the firearms and toolmarks 
community generated even more consternation within that community 
and among law enforcement officials.73 Late in 2016, the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) released a 
report on “ensuring scientific validity of feature-comparison methods.”74 
Like the two NAS reports, the PCAST report questions the AFTE 
theory of unstructured firearm-mark identification to a practical cer-
tainty. Indeed, it dismisses it as “clearly not a scientific theory,” but 
rather “a claim that examiners applying a subjective approach can 
 
71. E.g., 4 David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The 
Law and Science of Expert Testimony § 34:5–6 (2016–2017 ed.). This 
treatise refers to “cases like Green, Glynn, and Willock” as “partial and 
somewhat unsatisfying” and “a mere band-aid, requiring experts to slightly 
soften the language in which they express their conclusions, but not requiring 
any more significant modifications, nor any concrete empirical evidence 
regarding error rates, nor objective metrics to guide comparisons.” Id. § 34:5, 
at 893; see also Kaye et al., supra note 6, § 15.2.4, at 685 (describing the 
Monteiro line of cases as allowing “the expert [to] give a looser opinion 
intended to connote that even if there is some chance of a matching weapon 
somewhere in the world, the bullet very likely passed through the barrel of 
the gun in the case at bar” and observing that “[w]hether even this weaker 
statement of local individualization satisfies Daubert and Kumho Tire is open 
to serious question”).  
72. Giannelli et al., supra note 1, § 14.06[c], at 780; cf. Kaye et al., supra 
note 6, § 15.2.4, at 685 (“‘[T]o a reasonable degree of scientific certainty’ 
adds nothing meaningful to the opinion . . . .”); id. § 15.5, at 698 (“Unless 
the source probability is demonstrably very close to one, so that a source 
attribution is defensible, nonnumerical expressions of source probability do 
not seem promising.”). 
73. For discussion of early reactions of the forensic science establishment, see 
Adam B. Shniderman, Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science 
Reform: More Sharks in Dirty Water, 126 Yale L.J. F. 348 (2017); David 
H. Kaye, The National District Attorneys Association’s Slam: PCAST 
“Usurps the Constitutional Role of the Courts”, Forensic Sci., Stat. & L. 
(Sept. 5, 2016), http://for-sci-law.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-national-
district-attorneys.html [https://perma.cc/6FTT-GQE2]; David H. Kaye, 
The PCAST Report and Argumentum Ad Hominem, Forensic Sci., Stat. 
& L. (Sept. 24, 2016), http://for-sci-law.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-pcast-
report-and-argumentum-ad.html [https://perma.cc/9BQ8-FWQN]. 
74. 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3. 
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accurately individualize the origin of a toolmark” based on a “stated 
method” that “is circular.”75 
A. Validity of Traditional Firearm-Mark Analysis 
The report finds that, whatever the theory behind firearm-mark 
analysis may be, the AFTE procedure has yet to be validated. Finding 
Six is blunt: “PCAST finds that firearms analysis currently falls short 
of the criteria for foundational validity, because there is only a single 
appropriately designed study to measure validity and estimate reliabil-
ity. The scientific criteria for foundational validity require more than 
one such study, to demonstrate reproducibility.”76 
 
75. Id. at 60. In a reply to PCAST, the Firearms and Toolmark Subcommittee 
of the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science 
argued that the notion of sufficiency as the criterion for individualization is 
not circular because: 
The sufficient agreement threshold is exhibited when the amount of 
agreement is greater than best known non-matches established by 
the community and conveyed to each examiner through a lengthy 
and extensive training program. That is, it is not an arbitrary point. 
In fact, by definition, no non-matches can ever have more similarity 
than the sufficient agreement point. 
 Org. of Sci. Area Comms. (OSAC), Firearms and Toolmarks 
Subcomm., Response to the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology (PCAST) Call for Additional 
References Regarding Its Report “Forensic Science in Criminal 
Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison 
Methods” 9  (2016) [hereinafter OSAC Response], https://www.theiai. 
org/president/20161214_FATM_Response_to_PCAST.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/4AM5-32FX]; accord, Ass’n Firearm & Toolmark Exam’rs, 
Response to PCAST Report on Forensic Science (2016), 
https://afte.org/uploads/documents/AFTE-PCAST-Response.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5X52-9ZUC]. The idea is that examiners draw on a kind of internal 
database—an overall sense of the similarity of some set of the most closely 
matching pairs of items from different sources that they encountered when 
they were trained or in exercises since then. They compare their memory of 
the similarities in different-source specimens to the observed similarities in 
the current case. If the current pair is outside the remembered range for non-
mates, they believe that it is logically impossible for the current pair to have 
originated from the same source (“by definition,” that cannot occur). It 
seems doubtful that most courts would agree that this articulation provides 
the “specificity” required to avoid the kind of “circularity” or “inherent 
vagueness” that troubled the courts in Taylor, Willock, and Glynn. 
76. 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 112; see also id. at 111 (“The 
scientific criteria for foundational validity require appropriately designed 
studies by more than one group to ensure reproducibility. Because there has 
been only a single appropriately designed study, the current evidence falls 
short of the scientific criteria for foundational validity.”). The response from 
the OSAC subcommittee maintains that other types of studies supply ample 
proof of validity. OSAC Response, supra note 75, at 2–7. In an addendum 
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This damning conclusion follows from the specific criteria that 
PCAST adopted for establishing what it called “foundational valid-
ity.”77 Finding One of the report explains that: 
To establish foundational validity for a forensic feature-
comparison method, the following elements are required: (a) a 
reproducible and consistent procedure for (i) identifying features 
in evidence samples; (ii) comparing the features in two samples; 
and (iii) determining, based on the similarity between the features 
in two sets of features, whether the samples should be declared to 
be likely to come from the same source (“matching rule”); and 
(b) empirical estimates, from appropriately designed studies from 
multiple groups, that establish (i) the method’s false positive 
rate—that is, the probability it declares a proposed identification 
between samples that actually come from different sources and 
(ii) the method’s sensitivity—that is, the probability it declares a 
proposed identification between samples that actually come from 
the same source.78 
Among other things, the scientific validation studies “should be 
conducted so that the examinees have no information about the correct 
answer.”79 Furthermore, for source conclusions that are not the product 
of a standardized, step-by-step procedure that involves “little or no 
judgment,”80 PCAST insists on one, and apparently only one, approach 
to establishing foundational validity—“the method must be evaluated 
as if it were a ‘black box’ in the examiner’s head”81 via “black-box stud-
ies that measure how often many examiners reach accurate conclusions 
 
to the 2016 report, PCAST reiterated that the designs of most of the other 
studies are too flawed to permit them to be relied on to establish validity. 
PCAST, An Addendum to the PCAST Report on Forensic Science 
in Criminal Courts 7 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensics_addendum_fin
alv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH8W-FQUD] (“These studies do not provide 
useful information about the actual reliability of firearms analysis.”). It 
conceded that two additional studies, although still flawed, merited some 
consideration. Id. 
77. “Foundational validity” is not a standard phrase in metrology and statistics. 
“Validity” as PCAST defined it is discussed in Kaye et al., supra note 6, 
§ 15.7.5(c) (Cum. Supp. 2017), and Kaye, supra note 4, at 1653–54.  
78. 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 65. 
79. Id. at 66. 
80. Id. at 5 n.3. 
81. Id. at 5. 
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across many feature-comparison problems involving samples represen-
tative of the intended use.”82 
By applying the no-information-about-the-correct-answer criterion, 
PCAST narrowed the number of “appropriately designed” studies to 
one unpublished experiment. 83  The “Ames Laboratory study” was 
funded by the Department of Energy and reported in 2014.84 The 218 
examiners who elected to participate “made . . . 15 comparisons of 3 
knowns to 1 questioned cartridge case. For all participants, 5 of the sets 
were from known same-source firearms [known to the researchers but 
not the firearms examiners], and 10 of the sets were from known 
different-source firearms.”85 Ignoring “inconclusive” comparisons, the 
performance of the examiners is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Associations of Cartridge Cases to Handguns in the 
Ames Laboratory Performance Study (Baldwin 2014). 
 ~S +S  
–E 1421 4 1425 
+E 22 1075 1097 
 1443 1079  
–E is a negative finding (the examiner decided there was no 
association). 
 
82. Id. at 66. For both objective and subjective methods, “[t]he studies must (a) 
demonstrate that the method is repeatable and reproducible and (b) provide 
valid estimates of the method’s accuracy (that is, how often the method 
reaches an incorrect conclusion) that indicate the method is appropriate to 
the intended application.” Id. at 5. “Repeatable” and “reproducible” are 
terms of art in metrology.  
Repeatability describes the agreement within sets of 
measurements . . . where the same person uses the same 
equipment in the same way under the same conditions (including 
place and, as far as possible, time). Reproducibility . . . describes 
the agreement within a set of measurements . . . where different 
people, equipment, methods or conditions are involved.  
 Mike Goldsmith, Nat’l Physical Lab., Nat’l Measurement Sys., 
Good Practice Guide No. 118, A Beginner’s Guide to Measurement 
21 (2010), http://www.npl.co.uk/publications/a-beginners-guide-to-measure 
ment. [https://perma.cc/KT3M-B6LX]. 
83. 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 111. 
84. David P. Baldwin et al., Ames Laboratory, Dep’t of Energy, A 
Study of False-Positive and False-Negative Error Rates in 
Cartridge Case Comparisons, Technical Report #IS-5207 (2014), 
https://afte.org/uploads/documents/swggun-false-postive-false-negative-us 
doe.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VWZ-CPHK]. 
85. Id. at 10. 
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+E is a positive finding (the examiner decided there was an 
association). 
~S indicates that the cartridges came from bullets fired by a 
different gun. 
+S indicates that the cartridges came from bullets fired by the 
same gun. 
 
There were twenty-two positive findings among the 1443 compar-
isons for different sources, for an observed false-positive rate of 22/1443 
= 1.52%.86 Taken at face value, these results are encouraging. On 
average, examiners displayed high levels of accuracy, both for cartridge 
cases from the same gun (better than 99 percent specificity) and from 
different guns (better than 98 percent sensitivity). Firearms examiners 
are not reaching all these correct conclusions by chance. In addition, 
these figures apply to the classifications made by single examiners in 
isolation—assuming that all the participants completed the exercises by 
themselves. Having a second, independent examination and then recon-
ciling any differences in the outcomes before reporting an association or 
exclusion should reduce the rates of error. 
Even so, an examination of further details of the Ames study 
reinforces PCAST’s doubts about relying on this one study to conclude 
that a wide cross-section of examiners can achieve high accuracy rates. 
To begin with, researchers enrolled 284 volunteer examiners in the 
study by sending out emails and announcements in newsletters.87 Using 
volunteers often biases the results of an experiment.88 Second, one-third 
of the volunteers did not submit answers,89 so nonresponse bias is a 
further concern. Third, the volunteers who completed the tasks were 
told that that they were being tested to “benefit society by providing a 
better statistical evaluation of this common and important forensic 
discipline that will strengthen the legal system in its understanding of 
the value of firearms comparisons.”90 Finally, only one type of firearm 
 
86. Id. at 15–17. The 95 percent confidence interval is 0.96 percent to 2.30 
percent. Conversely, the observed true-positive rate (also called specificity) 
is 98.48 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval is 97.70 percent to 99.04 
percent. 
87. Id. at 8. 
88. See e.g., P. F. Pinsky et al., Evidence of a Healthy Volunteer Effect in the 
Prostate, Lung, Colorectal, and Ovarian Cancer Screening Trial, 165 Am. 
J. Epidemiology 874 (2007). 
89. Baldwin et al., supra note 84, at 8–9. 
90. Id. at 25. On the one hand, they may have been motivated to perform 
exceptionally well because they wanted to show that their work is valuable. 
On the other hand, they may have been less motivated by the knowledge 
that it was just an experiment rather than a part of a criminal investigation 
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and ammunition was used,91 and only impressions on cartridge cases 
were considered. 
As this example suggests, a robust set of studies—with different 
selection methods and conditions—is required to establish validity 
across an entire domain.92 But there are studies with other firearms that 
indicate that examiners can discern the matching item out of a set when 
they know that the set contains a cartridge case or bullet filed by the 
test gun. The 2016 report dismisses these as of no value in establishing 
validity because source attribution in this “closed set” situation does 
not lend itself to meaningful estimates of error rates and is much easier 
than making source attributions when the examiner does not know 
whether a bullet in the test set came from the gun.93 The very small 
error rates reported from such studies thus may grossly exaggerate 
accuracy, but they still lend some support to the claim that the ex-
pertise demonstrated in the Ames study extends beyond the limited 
circumstances of that study. 
Consequently, despite PCAST’s concerted effort to supply 
definitive criteria for judicial findings of the requisite degree of scientific 
validity to admit the conclusions of subjective interpretations of 
perceived features, 94 courts could continue to find that a sufficient 
scientific foundation for bullet-mark evidence exists even though the 
PCAST scientists did not. The report convincingly contends that 
“[n]othing—not training, personal experience nor professional 
 
and that no individual’s mistakes would be revealed to laboratory 
management. 
91. The experimenters selected the inexpensive Ruger SR9 semiautomatic 9-mm 
Lugar centerfire pistol. Id. at 5, 9. All the guns were new. The ammunition 
came from two lots made by one manufacturer. Id. at 9. 
92. See Hans Zeisel & David Kaye, Prove It with Figures: Empirical 
Methods in Law and Litigation 69 (1997) (“Consistent findings across 
different studies of the same type with different groups also are valuable, 
since they reduce the chance that the initial observations are due to a 
peculiarity in one group of subjects.”). 
93. Once an examiner picks the one true match, all the declarations of 
nonmatches are automatically correct. Experiments with other “set-to-set” 
designs have less dramatic internal dependencies but still fail to meet 
PCAST’s strict criterion for being informative. 
94. See, e.g., 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 4 (“[L]egal standards and 
scientific standards intersect. Judges’ decisions about the admissibility of 
scientific evidence rest solely on legal standards . . . . But, these decisions 
require making determinations about scientific validity. It is the proper 
province of the scientific community to provide guidance concerning 
scientific standards for scientific validity, and it is on those scientific 
standards that PCAST focuses here.”); id. at 5 (“[Foundational validity] is 
the scientific concept we mean to correspond to the legal requirement, in 
Rule 702(c), of ‘reliable principles and methods.’”). 
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practices—can substitute for adequate empirical demonstration of 
accuracy.”95 Nonetheless, there is still room to debate the threshold for 
an “adequate empirical demonstration.”96 
B. Error-Rates for Firearm-Mark Analysis 
Apparently recognizing that its criteria for an adequate empirical 
foundation might be disputed, the PCAST report hedges its bet. The 
report acknowledges that “[w]hether firearms analysis should be deemed 
admissible based on current evidence is a decision that belongs to the 
courts,”97 but urges that any courts that reject its pronouncements on 
scientific validity admit source attributions only when accompanied by 
quantitative estimates of the false-positive error rate as inferred from 
rigorous performance studies.98 
 
95. Id. at 4. 
96. Id. Finding 6 concludes:  
If firearms analysis is allowed in court, the scientific criteria for 
validity as applied should be understood to require clearly reporting 
the error rates seen in appropriately designed black-box studies 
(estimated at 1 in 66, with a 95 percent confidence limit of 1 in 46, 
in the one such study to date). 
 Id. at 112. In the Addendum, PCAST continued to insist that “[f]rom a 
scientific standpoint, scientific validity should require at least two properly 
designed studies to ensure reproducibility.” Addendum, supra note 76, at 7. 
But it conceded that there was some useful information in two other studies. 
It wrote that “[t]he issue for judges is whether one properly designed study, 
together with ancillary evidence from imperfect studies, adequately satisfies 
the legal criteria for scientific validity.” Id. at 7–8. Firearms examiners 
maintain that many other studies noted but deemed inappropriate in the 
2016 report comprise important evidence. OSAC Subcommittee Response, 
supra note 75, at 2. 
97. 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 112. 
98. Id. at 112 n.335. The meaning of 95 percent confidence is subtle and the 
description in the 2016 report is incorrect. David H. Kaye, PCAST’s 
Sampling Errors (Part I), Forensic Sci., Stat. & L. (Oct. 24, 2016), 
http://for-sci-law.blogspot.com/2016/10/pcasts-sampling-errors.html [https: 
//perma.cc/L2L9-VHE9]. Another way to report the same estimate of a false 
declaration of a match when the materials tested did not come from the 
same gun is that this interval goes from the 0.96 percent to 2.30 percent. 
Baldwin et al., supra note 84. For notes on some of the difficulties with 
PCAST’s approach to estimating false-positive probabilities as measures of 
probative value in a particular case, see David H. Kaye, PCAST’s Sampling 
Errors (Part II: Getting More Technical), Forensic Sci., Stat. & L. (Dec. 
11, 2016), http://for-sci-law.blogspot.com/2016/12/pcasts-sampling-errors-
part-ii-getting.html [https://perma.cc/WX3H-XFD6]; David H. Kaye, 
PCAST and the Ames Bullet Cartridge Study: Will the Real Error Rates 
Please Stand Up?, Forensic Sci., Stat. & L. (Nov. 1, 2016), http://for-
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But applying such numbers to individual examiners and particular 
cases is more challenging than the report recognizes. It is one thing to 
show that, as a group, some set of examiners can reach correct conclu-
sions in comparisons that they do not regard as inconclusive. It is 
another to accurately estimate the probability of an error for a given 
examiner in a particular comparison.99 Indeed, the 2016 report notes 
that “20 of the 22 false positives were made by just 5 of the 218 
examiners—strongly suggesting that the false positive rate is highly 
heterogeneous across the examiners”;100 however, the report does not 
discuss the implications of this heterogeneity for testimony about “the 
error rates” that it wants “clearly presented.”101 It calls for “rigorous 
proficiency testing” of the examiner and disclosure of those test 
results.102 There is a substantial argument for admitting both perfor-
mance-test-based estimates of error rates, but the report does not 
sci-law.blogspot.com/2016/11/pcast-and-ames-study-will-real-error.html 
[http s://perma.cc/T7JM-PY3Z]. 
99. This caveat does not mean that an average error rate in a study is irrelevant,
or that only examiner-specific “proficiency tests” on casework-like samples
of the same level of difficulty—in which examiner judgments also are
analyzed as the output of a black-box system—are relevant. It is sensible to
rely on average figures when nothing better is at hand, and to consider them
in conjunction with an individual-specific error-rate even when one is
available. See generally Dominique Fourdrinier & Martin T. Wells, On
Improved Loss Estimation for Shrinkage Estimators, 27 Stat. Sci. 61, 61
(2012); Hermanus H. Lemmer, Shrinkage Estimators, in 12 Encyclopedia
of Stat. Sci. 7704–7707 (Samuel Kotz, N. Balakrishnan, Campbell B. Read
& Brani Vidakovic eds., 2d ed. 2006).
100. 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 110.
101. Baldwin et al. cautioned that:
F]or the pool of participants used in this study the fraction of false
positives was approximately 1%. The study was specifically designed
to allow us to measure not simply a single number from a large
number of comparisons, but also to provide statistical insight into
the distribution and variability in false-positive error rates.
The . . . overall fraction is not necessarily representative of a rate
for each examiner in the pool. Instead, . . . the rate is a highly
heterogeneous mixture of a few examiners with higher rates and
most examiners with much lower error rates. This finding does not
mean that 1% of the time each examiner will make a false-positive
error. Nor does it mean that 1% of the time laboratories or agencies
would report false positives, since this study did not include standard
or existing quality assurance procedures, such as peer review or blind
reanalysis.
Baldwin et al., supra note 84, at 18. 
102. 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 113.
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develop the idea. 103 PCAST’s discussion of a false-positive rate from a 
study designed to show whether examiners as a group are generally ca-
pable of reaching correct results without verification should not be 
taken as a final word on how to estimate error rates for courtroom 
use.104 
VI. The Future 
It seems unlikely that the PCAST report will result in the 
widespread judicial rejection of largely subjective comparisons.105 But 
the recommendations and conclusions of yet a third body of accom-
plished scientists should intensify judicial reservations about testimony 
that the “chance of error [is] so remote as to be a ‘practical impos-
sibility.’”106 If the report has this effect, the issue of how to present the 
evidence becomes more critical. As previously noted, phrases like 
“reasonable ballistic certainty” and “more likely than not” are not the 
 
103. See supra note 99. 
104. Verification by a second examiner also is relevant to presenting or using an 
error rate. As previously noted, if the errors occur independently across 
examiners (as might be the case if the verification is truly blind), then the 
relevant false-positive error rate from the Ames study drops to (1.52%)2 = 
0.0231%. 
105. There are no published opinions on whether the analysis in the report 
warrants exclusion of firearm-mark evidence. In United States v. Chester, the 
district court wrote that “the report provides foundational scientific 
background and recommendations for further study. As such, the report does 
not dispute the accuracy or acceptance of firearm toolmark analysis within 
the courts.” Order at 1–2, United States v. Chester, No. 13 CR 00774 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 7, 2016), ECF No. 875. This reasoning overlooks the report’s 
insistence that the number of well-designed studies of firearm-mark 
identification is simply too small to establish the “foundational validity” 
required by Rule 702. Without explaining why PCAST’s understanding of 
the extent of the research is wrong, the court added that the error rates in 
the Ames study and one of the other ones discussed in the report were 
“sufficiently low.” Id. at 2. 
106. 2016 PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 145 (recommending that courts 
should never permit scientifically indefensible claims such as: “‘zero,’ 
‘vanishingly small,’ ‘essentially zero,’ ‘negligible,’ ‘minimal,’ or ‘microscopic’ 
error rates; ‘100 percent certainty’ or proof ‘to a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty;’ identification ‘to the exclusion of all other sources;’ or a 
chance of error so remote as to be a ‘practical impossibility.’”). “Practical 
impossibility” and “practical certainty” are signature phrases for firearms 
examiners. See supra notes 12, 43 and accompanying text; see also Ass’n 
Firearm & Toolmark Exam’rs, supra note 75, at 1 (“[E]xaminers 
employing standard, validated procedures will rarely, if ever, commit false 
identifications or false eliminations.”) (emphasis added). 
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solution. 107  Three more promising approaches are worth noting. If 
operating within the current paradigm of experience-and-training-based 
holistic conclusions, experts should not claim to be applying distinctly 
scientific methods for interpreting measurements or observations.108 To 
follow the AFTE logic, they could explain that they have been trained 
in comparing the variations in the marks left by a gun, and that the 
marks seem to diverge from the normal range that they recall—but that 
they have no quantitative knowledge of the variation that normally 
exists when bullets are fired from the same gun as opposed to different 
guns.109 And, any conclusion that the excess variation means that marks 
on the questioned item came from the known gun should be accompa-
nied by meaningful error probabilities. 
This kind of presentation corresponds to the “black box” perspec-
tive on the process. The examiner is treated no differently than a 
mysterious computer program that classifies questioned items into two 
categories—same gun, or different guns. The marks are the input or 
stimulus; a response of “same gun” or “different gun” is the output.110 
For the purpose of trusting the categorical conclusion, how the examiner 
performs the classification is not crucial. 111  The “operating charac-
teristics” of the examiner as a source detector,112 if adequately studied, 
 
107. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. Allowing testimony to “a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty,” however, is a fig leaf that does not 
provide decent modesty. The witness often is presented as a scientist, 
applying a scientific method and using scientific terms. The phrase “to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty” adds nothing meaningful to the 
opinion of such a witness, and extirpating the phrase does not go far toward 
closing the distance between a firm opinion and a well-warranted one. Kaye 
et al., supra note 6, § 15.7.1 (Cum. Supp. 2015).  
108. See Kaye, supra note 4, at 13–15. 
109. As such, they should not use the phrases like “individual marks.” Cf. Kaye 
et al., supra note 6, § 15.7.1(c), at 254 (Cum. Supp. 2015) (“The demand 
that the forensic science community perpetuate the time-honored but 
intellectually unsatisfying theory of individual versus class characteristics is 
unfortunate.”). “Class characteristics” are acquired via a manufacturing or 
other process that is known to be uniform enough to produce many items 
with that characteristic. Other characteristics are acquired via a more 
variable process that produces fewer items with the same characteristic, but 
no law of nature dictates that an “individual characteristic” exists in one and 
only one item. 
110. This is putting to the side a refusal to reach a clear conclusion by declaring 
that the evidence is inconclusive. 
111. The fact that a classification procedure is based on a valid theory lends 
credence to its results, but the theory is not a complete substitute for 
empirical testing of the procedure or its components. 
112. For a discussion of operating characteristics of a statistical classification 
procedure, see, for example, Thomas D. Wickens, Elementary Signal 
Detection Theory (2002); Nat’l Research Council, Assembly of 
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are sufficient. Broadly speaking, this is the PCAST perspective on 
validation and presentation of traditional testimony. 
However, it is not necessary for the examiner to be an inscrutable 
detector that registers either a same-gun signal or its absence. Many 
forensic scientists and statisticians favor a second mode of presentation 
in which the examiner describes (1) how often the perceived degree of 
agreement between the questioned specimen and those from the test 
firings would be seen if all the specimens came from the same gun and 
(2) how often such similarity would be seen if the questioned specimens 
came from a different gun.113 The extent to which (1) exceeds (2) 
indicates how much the evidence supports the same-source conclusion 
as opposed to the different-source conclusion.114 Describing the strength 
of the evidence in this manner—without any categorical conclusion 
from the expert’s mind—is an attractive alternative to conventional 
testimony. 115  A firearms analyst should be able to articulate the 
“likelihoods”—the rough probabilities of the marks given each 
hypothesis about the source and the basis for these judgments about 
the evidence. Assessing the likelihoods is the expertise that lay jurors 
lack and that is supposed to come with training and experience in the 
field. But jurors can decide which likelihood ratios are large enough to 
warrant a source attribution as well as firearms experts can.116 When 
experts take over that task, they end up presenting radically different 
conclusions for marks that are just shy of their implicit and 
 
Behavioral and Soc. Scis., Comm. on Evaluation of Sound 
Spectrograms, On the Theory and Practice of Voice 
Identification 27–30 (1979). 
113. Geoffrey Stewart Morrison et al., A Comment on the PCAST Report: Skip 
the “Match”/”Non-match” Stage, 272 Forensic Sci. Int’l 7, 7–8 (2017); 
see also Bernard Robertson et al., Interpreting Evidence: 
Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom (2d ed. 2016); 
European Network of Forensic Sci. Insts., ENFSI Guideline for 
the Formulation of Evaluative Reports in Forensic Science: 
Strengthening the Evaluation of Forensic Results Across 
Europe (STEOFRAE) § 7.1.2–7.1.3, at 87–90 (2015); I. W. Evett et al., 
Finding the Way Forward for Forensic Science in the US—A Commentary 
on the PCAST Report, 278 Forensic Sci. Int’l 16 (2017). 
114. See e.g., Kaye et al., supra note 6, § 14.2.1, at 631; David H. Kaye, Digging 
into the Foundations of Evidence Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 915, 923–25 
(2017). 
115. Of course, proof that examiners’ judgments of the weight of evidence are 
reasonably accurate is necessary. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 4, at 21. 
116. Cf. David H. Kaye, Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and a Pair of Shoes, 
Jurimetrics J., Fall 2012, at 1, 9 (applying this argument in the context of 
footwear-mark testimony). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Firearm-Mark Evidence: Looking Back and Looking Ahead 
746 
unarticulated cutoff for source attribution than for marks that are bare-
ly over their threshold.117 
The preceding two approaches are still predominantly subjective. 
In the longer term, we can and should expect expert testimony to be 
informed by statistical data about the frequency of types of marks on 
bullets or cartridge cases as determined from reference databases.118 
Three-dimensional imaging methods allow automated feature extrac-
tion.119 With data on the distributions of similarity scores in items from 
the same gun and items from different ones, statistical models can 
generate quantitative likelihood ratios.120 Such systems are statistically 
reliable—the same inputs generate the same outputs—and they can be 
validated empirically by investigating their performance on different 
data sets. Progress in these endeavors will enable firearms examiners to 
speak more fittingly of the “The Science Behind Firearm and Tool Mark 
Examination.”121 
 
 
117. See e.g., Robertson et al., supra note 113, § 5.4, at 63–64; Morrison et 
al., supra note 113, at 7–8. 
118. In 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology established such 
a database. NIST Ballistics Toolmark Database, Nat’l Inst. of 
Standards and Tech. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/programs-
projects/nist-ballistics-toolmark-database [https://perma.cc/3VGN-HGWT]. 
119. See e.g., Daniel Ott et al., Identifying Persistent and Characteristic Features 
in Firearm Tool Marks on Cartridge Cases, Surface Topography: 
Metrology & Props. (2017), http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/ 
2051-@ben672X/aa864a [https://perma.cc/NEE7-MJGR]. 
120. See e.g., Fabiano Riva & Christophe Champod, Automatic Comparison and 
Evaluation of Impressions Left by a Firearm on Fired Cartridge Cases, 59 
J. Forensic Sci. 637, 638 (2014). 
121. Nancy Ritter, The Science Behind Firearm and Tool Mark Examination, 
Nat’l Inst. of Just. (Oct. 2014), https://nij.gov/journals/274/Pages/ 
firearm-toolmark-examination.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z7BM-FQ5E].  
